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PUBLIC SPEECH AND PUBLIC ORDER IN BRITAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES
RICHARD E. STEWART*

I. GENmiAL ITMODUCTION
This paper will not attempt a general comparison of free speech in
Britain and the United States. It concentrates on one aspect of the
free speech problem. That aspect is speech that does or may lead to
a breach of the peace by the audience.'
We may start this specific inquiry with some observations so
general as to belong in a preface and not in a conclusion. Peaceful,
democratic societies like Britain and the United States esteem freedom
of speech. They also esteem the peacefulness of their citizens. The
freedom should not be trampled by the police; the citizens should
not be trampled by rioters. Our problem is rooted in political philosophy, and many thoughtful men have reflected on how freedom and
order are opposed or complementary.2 A more modest but perhaps
useful task is to examine and compare what is actually done about
one kind of freedom and one kind of order in two similar societies,
leaving the reader to decide whether what is done ought to be done.
Unfortunately, our only data are decided cases. They are few, and
soap box speeches are many. Cases gather on the fringe of everyday
behavior. What happens in a nation's courtrooms may not be a
perfect guide to what happens in its streets.
The frame of comparison should include the following facts. In
the United States, the Supreme Court can effectively nullify a state
3
or federal statute that conflicts with the United States Constitution.
No court in Britain can refuse to enforce an Act of Parliament. 4 For
the most part, Parliament has not legislated on speech that leads to
disorder.5 The British legal rules we shall investigate are mainly
*B.A., West Virginia Univ., 1955; B.A. Jurisp. (Oxon), 1957; LL.B., Harvard,
1959. The writer wishes to thank Professor Paul A. Freund of Harvard Law
School, under whose wise and kindly guidance this paper was prepared, and
Mr. A. M. Honor6, Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford, who read the manuscrip and made valuable suggestions.
1. The speech itself, because of loudness, etc., may disturb the peace. Cf.
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). The audience may illegally obstruct a
highway. Homer v. Cadman, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 51 (Q.B. 1886). This paper
does not deal with those questions.
2. Some references are collected in Note, Freedom of Speech and Assembly:
The Problem of the Hostile Audience, 49 CoLJm. L. REv. 1118 (1949).
3. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. Lee v. Bude & Torrington Junction Ry., L.R. 6 C.P. 576, 582 (1871).
5. The most recent statute is the Public Order Act, 1936, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo.
6, c. 6. Section 5 of that Act provides: "Any person who in any public place
or at any public meeting uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or
behavior with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach
of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty of an offence." Section
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common law rules.
In the United States, a litigant can invoke the constitutional
guarantees of free speech against federal or state governments. 6 He
may also be able to rely on a state constitution, but to avoid burying
our comparison in citations, this paper will focus on the federal
constitutional questions. In Britain, the speaker has no written
guarantee good even against police or judicial, let alone legislative,
interference. Therefore, in British cases the constitutional questions
are not separated from the substantive law of the wrong (e.g., unlawful assembly, trespass). They are subsumed under the question of
coverage. 7 This is an important difference in judicial approach from
that of the American courts.
When during or after a speech the audience breaks the peace, or
when officials apprehend that it will do so, there are several ways the
state can apply force in the interest of order. It can prevent the
meeting from being held at all, or from being held at a particularly
dangerous time and place. While permitting the meeting, it can
restrain the crowd or stop the speaker if the crowd gets unruly. It
can estreat a bond the speaker has given to secure the peace. It can
punish the speaker and/or the audience for what happened or what
might have happened.
Of these methods, most American cases concern prohibition under
a licensing scheme and punishment. The United Kingdom cases
involve the bond or recognizance, police intervention during the
meeting, and punishment. The license cases are confined to American
courts probably because license requirements are based on a statute,
which could not be challenged in England. 8 Recognizances are used
5 is almost identical to N.Y. Penal Law § 722(1), infra note 38. The Public
Order Act, 1936, supra, was aimed at fascist demonstrations. See generally

Comment, Public Order and the Right of Assembly in England and the

United States, 47 YALE L.J. 404 (1938). Section 5 cannot be made much
clearer by exposition. In the twenty-two years since enactment, it appears
to have been invoked in only one reported case, Wilson v. Skeock, [1949]
W.N. 203 (K.B.) (§ 5 not applicable to "abusive language between neighbors").
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The freedoms of speech and assembly are cognate.
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,
364 (1937). Speech to a crowd involves both freedoms. Therefore, in this
paper they are treated together and usually denominated compendiously as
'"ree speech," etc. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 imposes similar limitations on
the states. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
7. Cf. DICEY, LAw OF TH= CONSTITUTIoN 239, 246 (9th ed. 1939).
8. Apparently the only case holding the parent statute invalid is M'Ara v.
Magistrates of Edinburgh, [1913] Sess. Cas. 1059 (Scot. 1st Div.) (statute in
desuetude under Scots law). A more common line of attack is that the
local licensing by-law is ultra vires the parent Act. See generally Kruse v.
Johnson, [1898] 2 Q.B. 91. This problem of delegated legislation is no different
in the free speech area from elsewhere, and turns mostly on construction of
the parent statute. Since Parliament would never authorize the unreasonable,
some cases hold by-laws ultra vires because unreasonable. Two indicia of
unreasonableness resemble arguments in American license cases. See Munro
v. Watson, 57 L.T.R. (n.s.) 366 (Q.B. 1887) (excessive discretion); Johnson
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in this area only in Britain. Most American state courts have
jurisdiction to bind over to keep the peace, under rules similar to
those in England. 9 But no American case has been found in which
a person had to give a penal bond because the court feared he would
make a speech that would lead to a breach of the peace.
The rest of this paper is planned as follows. First the United States
rules will be set forth and discussed. Next the United Kingdom
rules. Each country's cases will be divided into classes used by that
country's own courts. Comparison will come last, for it will have
more meaning after each rule has been seen in its national context.
II. UNITED STATES

A. Introduction
A few American cases concern on-the-spot intervention or injunctions against speech. 10 A great many concern licenses or criminal
convictions. These last two sanctions are so different that courts find
it easy to apply a prior restraint-subsequent punishment distinction
to the facts of each case. The distinction is well criticized as oversimple." It originally related to government licensing of the press,
not of speaking. 2 Descriptively, the words "prior" or "previous" add
nothing to the notion of restraint. They may do nothing more than
express the ultimate conclusion of unconstitutionality. The Court
speaks of valid restraints, but not of valid prior restraints. Still,
more or less following the courts' own practice, we shall examine
separately the cases on licensing, injunction, intervention, and punishment.
B. Before the Speech
1. License.-Under the recent decisions, a licensing scheme can be
an unconstitutional restraint of speech for any one of three reasons: 13
v. Mayor of Croyden, 16 Q.B.D. 708 (1886) (discrimination).
9. See generally People v. Blaylock, 357 Ill. 23, 191 N.E. 206, 93 A.L.R. 300
(1934); State v. Read, 164 La. 315, 113 So. 860, 54 A.L.R. 383 (1927).
10. Injunctions against the speaker are to be distinguished from injunctions
against those who would interfere with the speaker. The latter are common,
but are outside the scope of this paper. On injunctions against interference
with the exercise of a civil right, see Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939);
Annot., 175 A.L.R. 438, 467-72 (1948).

11. See Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REv.
533, 537-39 (1951).
12. Cf. The King v. Dean of St. Asaph, 3 T.R. 428n., 100 Eng. Rep. 657n.
(K.B. 1784) per Lord Mansfield, C.J.: "The liberty of the press consists in

printing without any previous license, subject to the consequence of law."
3 T.R. at 433n. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52.

13. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897), upholding a licensing ordi-

nance that set no standards to guide the officials, is almost certainly no
longer law. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Hague v. C.I.O,
supra note 10.

409-33 (1941).

See generally CHAFES, FREE SPEECH iN THE UNITED STATES
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First,discriminatory administration. 14 This is separate from the ques-

tion of excessive discretion in the licensing official. 15 Second, too much
official discretion in deciding whether or not to grant the permit.'8
Third, grounds for refusing a permit which do not justify the restraint
on speech. If the standard is wrong, it matters not that it be narrowly
drawn or fairly administered. Time, place, and manner are valid
licensing standards.' 7 Whether they are the only valid standards is
not clear. Specifically, it has not been decided that all licensing
standards relating to anticipated disorder are void. Hague v. CIO 18
held invalid a standard of anticipated riot not limited to riots for
which the speaker (applicant) could be held responsible. Indeed, in
that case, the riot was to be by opponents, due to their general
antagonism to the applicant, rather than to any particular thing
applicant was expected to say. In Kunz v. New York, 9 the licensing
ordinance was stricken down because it stated no standards for refusal. 20 The Court did not suggest that an ordinance denying a permit
to one who "ridicules and denounces other religious beliefs," a
standard used in the ordinance but for another purpose, would be
invalid. Even if it were invalid, a standard of anticipated incitement or provocation of breach of the peace might still be valid. 21
If a breach of the peace norm is to be upheld, it will not be by simple extension of the reasoning that upholds standards of time and
place. First, licensing considerations of time and place look to other
legitimate uses of public streets and parks. The license acts as a traffic
light. So to analyze a standard based on the preservation of order
would be to obscure its chief merit. Second, denying a permit
on grounds of time and place need not prevent the meeting entirely. Thus on its face, such an ordinance interferes with speech
less than does one basing permits on the speech's contents. This
could also be true of a breach of the peace standard if the licensing
authority believed the applicant would cause a disturbance at one
time and place but not at another. It seems likely that the Court
would uphold a licensing standard that included (1) reference to
the public interest in public order, (2) requirement of anticipated
advocacy or provocation of disorder, and serious danger that dis14. Niemotko v. Maryland, supra note 13; Hague v. CIO supra note 10.
15. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (prohibition against
meetings in a park held invalid because discriminatory against one religion;
no official discretion as to individual meetings).
16. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, supra
note 13; Hague v. CIO, supra note 10.
17. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569 (1941).
18. Supra note 10.

19. Supranote 16.

20. 340 U.S. 290, 293, 295 (1951).
21. Cf. Freund, supra note 11, at 544 n. 53.
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order would ensue, with adequate proof needed for each, and (3)
22
limitation of denial to a particular time and place.
2. Injunction.-Injunctions against speech that is expected to cause
disorder would be more like the British practice of binding over
than are licensing schemes. Like recognizances, injunctions come
from a court, are directed at a particular person, are based on a
present fact situation, and can restrain certain objectionable speech
without stopping speech altogether. Yet apposite cases are scarce.
In Thomas v. Collins,-3 the charge was contempt for defying a
temporary restraining order, but the issue was the validity of the
license requirement which the order buttressed. 24 Near v. Minnesota25
involved an injunction against a particular publication, but for historical reasons cases on restraint of the press are doubtful precedents
26
for the spoken word.
Apparently the only case on enjoining speech that is expected to
cause a breach of the peace is Kasper v. Brittain." There, John
Kasper was enjoined from illegally obstructing school integration
in Clinton, Tennessee. He violated the injunction by a characteristic
speech, was convicted of contempt, and appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the first amendment did not prevent a
federal court from enjoining the "advocacy of immediate action to
accomplish an illegal result .. ."28 It is not clear whether the court
would have upheld the injunction absent mob violence, but the decision does imply that one who is expected to incite violence can be
enjoined from so speaking. This would combine the solicitation of
illegality with the threat of disorder, and the court in Kasper V.
Brittainrelied on both.29
Cases on enjoining picketing point the same way. Picketing is
protected speech within the first and fourteenth amendments. 0 Yet
picketing that solicits an illegal agreement can be enjoined. 31 Where
picketing is enmeshed in contemporary violence, a court may enjoin
all picketing, including that which is itself peaceful.3 2 These last
two rules together contain both factors the court relied on in
Kasper v. Brittain.33 The picketing cases do not, however, advance
22. Extrajudicially, even Mr. Justice Douglas agrees that a properly drawn
license standard looking to riot would be valid. DouGLAs, THE RiGHT or THE

PzopLE 59 (1958).

23. 323 U.S. 516 (1944).
24. 323 U.S. 516, 538-41 (1944).
25. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Cf. 283 U.S. 697, 708, 713-14 (1931).
245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957).
245 F.2d at 96.
Id. at 95-96.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
Giboney v. Empire Storage &Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
Mvilk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
Supra note 27; see text accompanying note 29 supra.
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our analysis, because picketing now appears constitutionally more
susceptible to injunction than is ordinary speech.34 The only safe inference is that the picketing cases are not inconsistent with the view
that ordinary speech inciting a breach of the peace may be enjoined.
C. Duringthe Speech: Intervention and Dispersal
Surprisingly few cases in state or federal courts concern the
propriety of police intervention against a speaker to prevent a breach
of the peace by his audience. 35 Where nothing in the speaker's
manner or words or in the circumstances is likely to lead to breach
of the peace, police suppression of the speaker is unconstitutional. 36
Presumably if the speaker is doing something for which he could
constitutionally be punished, like soliciting the commission of crimes,
the police may intervene to stop him. By arresting him for what he
has already done, the police would necessarily stop his speech. But
more difficult constitutional problems arise where the police stop
the speech not because anything unlawful has yet happened, but
because they expect that if the speaker continues, something unlawful (a breach of the peace by the audience) will happen. Apparently
the only American case, at any level, whose facts squarely pose this
problem, is Feiner v. New York. 37 There, the defendant was speaking at a street meeting to an audience of Negroes and whites. He
called certain public officials "bums," and urged Negroes to rise up
and fight for equal rights. The trial court found, over conflicting
testimony, that he had said they should rise up "in arms." The
crowd of about seventy-five persons milled and murmured, but
there was no disorder or breach of the peace. Two policemen had
been present for about twenty minutes. After one auditor told a
policeman that he would shut Feiner up if the police would not, the
officer asked Feiner to stop speaking. After two such requests
went unheeded, the policeman arrested him. Feiner was convicted
of disorderly conduct under New York Penal Law, section 722(2).38
Three courts affirmed that conviction over defendant's free speech
34. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
35. Dispersal because the speaker or his audience is blocking traffic on a
street is not here considered.
36. Pope v. State, 192 Misc. 587, 79 N.Y.S.2d 466 (Ct. Cl. 1948) (carrying
protest sign at meeting).
37. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
38. N.Y. Penal Law § 722: "Any person who with intent to provoke a
breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned,
commits any of the following acts shall be deemed to have committed the
offense of disorderly conduct:
1) Uses offensive, disorderly, threatening, abusive or insulting language,
conduct, or behavior;
2) Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct,
or be offensive to others;
3) Congregates with others on a public street and refuses to move on
when ordered by the police."
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objections. It is necessary to examine the case in some detail in
order to ascertain how the police intervention fitted into the offense.
The police intervention problem would have best been isolated
if Feiner had either been prosecuted under section 722(3) of the
Penal Law3 9 or else had sued the arresting officer for trespass40 or for
deprivation of constitutionally secured rights under the Civil Rights
Act. 41 Even under section 722(2), Feiner's disobeying the policeman
could by itself have constituted the offense.42 But the prosecution
did not rely merely on that, and the defense never tried so to narrow
43
the issues.
In his opinion, the trial judge listed disobedience of the police
request as one of the facts supporting the charge.44 On appeal, the
County Court considered it at least relevant, and perhaps as independently sufficient, provided the request was justified (to which
the likelihood of disorder would be relevant).45 On further appeal,
the New York Court of Appeals inferred from all the facts Feiner's
intent to provoke a breach of the peace, which, together with his
abusive language, violated section 722(2). 46 Disobeying the police
would appear relevant only to the speaker's intent to cause disorder.
Alternatively, the Court of Appeals held that disobeying a policeman's request made "within the scope of his lawful authority," was
itself disorderly conduct. 47 When considering the constitutionality
of the conviction, the Court of Appeals combined these alternative
grounds, holding that the United States Constitution permitted conviction where (1) the speaker intended to provoke a breach of the
peace, (2) police at the scene believed in good faith that there was
a clear and present danger of disorder, and (3) the speaker ignored
the policeman's request to stop speaking." Even this reasoning does
not require that the speaker have yet said anything that would
39. Note 38 supra,subsection 3.

40. As in the British cases, pp. 641-45 infra.

41. Civil Rights Act of 1871 § 1, REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1952). As in Hague v. CIO, supra note 10, and Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d
877 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948).

42. Cf. People v. Garvey, 6 Misc. 2d 266, 79 N.Y.S.2d 456 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct.
1948).
43. But see Feiner v. New York, supra note 37, at 325 (dissenting opinion
of Black, J.).
44. "I think that all those facts that have been testified to here are sufficient to sustain the charge of disorderly conduct." Record, p. 140, Feiner v.
New York, supra note 37. Perhaps the main reason, in the judge's mind, was
that those who "advocate change by violence and .

.

. pit .

.

. race against

race . . . should be denied the right of freedom of speech." Record, p. 137.
45. Record, p. 146. The Trial Court and County Court opinions are not
reported.
46. 300 N.Y. 391, 398-99, 91 N.E.2d 316, 319 (1950).
47. 300 N.Y. at 399, 91 N.E.2d at 319, citing People v. Galpern, 259 N.Y. 279,
181 N.E. 572, 83 A.L.R. 785 (1932) (conviction under § 722 (3) affirmed on
ground that an unwarranted request to move on is still within the policeman's
lawful authority; no constitutional question raised).
48. 300 N.Y. at 402, 91 N.E.2d at 321.
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incite or provoke a breach of the peace. 49 Nor does it require that the
court agree with the officer's estimate of the danger.
In the United States Supreme Court, petitioner argued that the
police intervention was irrelevant to guilt under section 722(2),50
but was itself an unconstitutional interference with freedom of
speech. 51 Respondent did not make clear exactly how the police intervention related to the charge.5 2 Petitioner contended that interven53
tion, like punishment, must meet the clear and present danger test.
54
The Court apparently accepted this argument.
Petitioner further
pressed for a judicial assessment of the danger.5 But the Court
held the constitutional requirement satisfied if the police in good
faith apprehended a clear and present danger of disorder. 56 The
police then had a "proper discretionary power" to preserve the peace
as they saw fit.9 At the end of its opinion, the majority bases affirmance on the fact that Feiner was inciting to riot.5 8 Assuming that
the majority is laying down this rule for police intervention, rather
than for punishment afterwards, 59 it appears that a speaker who incites to riot may be stopped by police who apprehend in good faith
that disorder is imminent. It is irrelevant that they could have
preserved the peace without interrupting the speech. If a speaker
was not speaking intemperately, or perhaps merely if he was not
inciting to riot, a future Court might still allow the police to intervene
only if there were no other practicable way for them to preserve the
peace.

60

49. It is hard to find in the Record any support for the various courts'
findings that Feiner intended to cause a breach of the peace. The clearest
threat of disorder came from an antagonist. This is, however, beside our point.
50. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 24-27, 39-41, 45, Feiner v. New York, supra
note 37.
51. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 26, 37, 53.
52. See Brief for Respondent, pp. 61-65.
53. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 26, 37, 53.
54. See 340 U.S. at 319.
55. Brief for Petitioner, p. 51. This could be done by the trial court. The
argument is te be distinguished from that for a redetermination of facts by
the Supreme Court despite lower court findings.
56. 340 U.S. at 319.
57. Id. at 319n., quoting the N.Y. Court of Appeals.
58. Id. at 321. Actual incitement, as opposed to an intent to incite, had not
been found by any of the lower courts.
59. The very failure to separate intervention from punishment may suggest
that the majority regarded the rules as being the same. Surely this would
only be true where the speaker was inciting to disorder, and even there a
policeman's belief that there was a clear and present danger might not by
itself satisfy the constitutional test for punishment.
60. It must be admitted that nothing in the majority opinion suggests such
a rule. The majority's view of Feiner's language merely leaves the question
open. But such a result would accord with the British caes, pp. 641-45 infra.
It would not be inconsistent with the view of Frankfurter, J., concurring in
Feiner v. New York, supra note 37, that "it is not a constitutional principle
that, in acting to preserve order, the police must proceed against the crowd,
whatever its size and temper, and not against the speaker." 340 U.S. at 289.
(Emphasis added).
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In Feiner v. New York, Mr. Justice Black dissented in an opinion,
and Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in an opinion in which Mr. Justice
Minton joined.61 The dissenters isolated the intervention question
more clearly than did the majority. They stated that the first duty
62
is
of the police was to control the crowd. Only if the Court
satisfied that there was a clear and present danger of disorder that
the police could not otherwise prevent, would the police be justified
in stopping the speaker. However, the dissenters proceeded from the
view that Feiner was not inciting to riot. While conceding other of
the majority's facts for the sake of argument, they never conceded
that one. Consequently, the dissents are not necessarily inconsistent
with the decision. Rather they are directed at the situation which,
it is believed, a properly narrow reading of the majority opinion
leaves open.
In Sellers v. Johnson,63 a police blockade against would-be assemblers was enjoined on the ground that the police must first try
to restrain the violent opponents of a lawful meeting. In that
case, cited by a dissenter6 but not by the majority in Feiner v. New
York, the police action was designed to meet a particular situation,
and the police had access to almost as many facts as if the meeting
had begun. Thus the blockade differed from dispersal only in the
formal respect that the meeting had not yet met. The court treated
the problem like one of police intervention during the meeting, and
held that until the police have exhausted all available means of
dealing with the mob, there is no clear and present danger of disorder justifying suppression of speech. 65 This probably means that
the court must be satisfied there was no other practicable way to
preserve the peace.66 This would appear to be the constitutional
standard for police intervention where the speaker is not inciting to
riot, or at least where he does not intend to provoke a breach of the
67
peace.
D. After the Speech: Punishment
Generally, federal or state punishments for speech or its effects
61. 340 U.S. at 321, 329.
62. That is, the Supreme Court. But apart from the dissenters' view on
redetermining facts found below, the danger and necessity would at least
have to be proved to the trial court. The policeman's good faith belief would
not be enough.
63. Supra note 41.
64. 340 U.S. at 326 n.8 (Black, J.).
65. 163 F.2d 877, 882-83 (8th Cir. 1947). But see 61 HARv. L. REV. 537 (1948).
66. See also American League of Friends of the New Germany v. Eastmead,
116 N.J. Eq. 487, 174 AUt. 156 (Ch. 1934); Brief of the Committee on the Bill
of Rights, American Bar Association, as Amicus Curiae, Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496 (1939), summarized id. at 678.
67. If the dividing line between Feiner v. New York, supra note 37, and
Sellers v. Johnson, supra note 41, is incitement, then all intervention before
the speech begins will have to meet the stricter (Sellers v. Johnson) test.
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must meet the clear and present danger test.68 This "test" labels a
judicial reasoning process that begins by recognizing that federal and
state governments can, despite the first and fourteenth amendments,
punish for speech where the government is protecting an important
interest against serious threat. The importance of the interest, and
the gravity, likelihood, and imminence of the threat posed by the
punished speech are weighed against the constitutional mandate.69
This technique is used where disorder is the danger.70 If the meeting
in question is not broken up by police, the court trying the speaker
will know whether the speech was in fact followed by disorder. But
this appears relevant only to the likelihood of disorder. In Terminieilo v. Chicago7 1 the Court reversed the speaker's conviction although there was in fact a breach of the peace. In Feiner v. New
York,72 the Court upheld his conviction although there was in fact no
breach of the peace.
1. Fighting Words.--"Fighting words," because their threat to the
peace so far outweighs their value in communicating ideas, are constitutionally punishable.73 Fighting words are words "likely to cause
an average addressee to fight."74 Hence they must be insulting to
the person to whom they are addressed. 5 The better view is that
the doctrine applies to such words addressed to a group as well as
to an individual.76 Fighting words might be viewed as incitements
to breach of the peace, albeit against the speaker. But the danger of
violence is here generalized or abstracted. Only the standard of guilt
need meet the clear and present danger test. The speaker's intent
and the addressee's actual reaction are irrelevant. This is because
"fighting words" are deemed to be outside the protection of the
Constitution.77 Apart from fighting words, speech likely to lead to
68. E.g., Feiner v. New York, supra note 37; Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919).
69. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374-78 (1926) (Brandeis and Holmes,
JJ., concurring); cf. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 27-28

(1949); HAND, Tm BILL OF RIGHTS 58-61 (1958). This approach can be used
on other free speech problems as well as on punishment. See Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273-89 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
70. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
71. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
72. Supra note 37.
73. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
74. Id. at 571.
75. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra note 73; Cantwell v. Connecticut,
supra note 70 (dictum).
76. See City of Chicago v. Terminiello, 400 Ill. 23, 79 N.E.2d 39 (1948),
rev'd on other grounds, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). See also opinion of Ill. Appellate
Court (unreported), Record, p. 26; Brief in Opposition to Certiorari, p. 12;
Brief for Respondent, p. 15; Reply Brief for Petitioner, p. 15; Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
77. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra note 73. It might not matter
if the addressee were paralyzed and deaf. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
supra, he was a policeman, who could be expected to have more than average
self-restraint.
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violence is only punishable if the facts of the particular case meet
the clear and present danger test.
2. Incitement to Break the Peace.-Incitement to riot or breach
of the peace is a common law misdemeanor. Where riot or breach
of the peace is itself illegal, the speaker may be viewed as soliciting
the commission of a crime. Apart from constitutional questions, one
is guilty of inciting a breach of the peace when he urges his audience
to violence, intending that violence ensue. 78 This common law crime
is often codified, but the rules usually remain the same.79 It includes
non-speech communication, like carrying a red flag. 80
Most of the decisions came before the fourteenth amendment was
held8' to limit the states' power to punish speech. While the authority
is not conclusive, it appears that the state or federal governments 82
can constitutionally punish a speaker for inciting to breach of the
peace. That is, if the standard of guilt includes intent to cause
breach of the peace, inflammatory language, and the likelihood that
disorder will follow, the standard is constitutional. 83 It may be part
of a general rule that incitements to crime are punishable, at least if
the crime is serious enough. 84 The better approach here seems to
be that prompted by the clear and present danger test, rather than
that simply thrusting incitement to crime outside the first and
fourteenth amendments, along with obscenity and fighting words.85
Incitement to audience conduct less serious than breach of the
The Court has similarly analyzed obscenity and libel as being without con-

stitutional protection. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity);

Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (libel).
78. State v. Schleifer, 99 Conn. 432, 121 Atl. 805 (1923); Commonwealth
v. Sciullo, Appeal of Albert, 169 Pa. Super. 318, 82 A.2d 695 (1951); Commonwealth v. Merrick, 65 Pa. Super. 482 (1917).

79. See, e.g., State v. Quinlan, 86 N.J.L. 120, 91 Atl. 111 (Sup. Ct. 1914).

80. Commonwealth v. Karvonen, 219 Mass. 30, 106 N.E. 556 (1914); People
v. Burman, 154 Mich. 150, 117 N.W. 589, 25 L.R.A. (n.s.) 251 (1908); cf. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
81. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Stromberg v. California,
supra note 80, of course, centered on the constitutional question, but the

anticipated evil there was not simply disorder but also overthrow of the gov-

ernment. In Commonwealth v. Sciullo, Appeal of Albert, supra note 78, the
constitutional argument was rejected without much discussion.
82. Usually it is the state. No distinction has been drawn between the
federal government and the states as to magnitude of interest in preserving
the peace. But cf. Roth v. United States, supra note 77, at 497-99 (separate
opinion of Harlan, J.).
83. City of Chicago v. Terminiello, supra note 76. This is not the ratio
decidendi of any Supreme Court case. But it is consistent with dicta in

Terminiello v. Chicago, supra note 71, at 13-14, 25-28, 32-37 (dissenting opinion of Jackson, J.); Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 70, at 308; Stromberg
v. California, supra note 80, at 368-69; and Schenck v. United States, supra
note 68, at 52, 57. No contrary authority has been found.
84. See Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915); 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1948)

(one who counsels commission of crime is guilty as principal);

supra note 69, at 58.

HAND,

op. cit.

85. But see Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.

834 (1957).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 13

peace is not punishable. In Terminiello v. Chicago,86 the Court,
reasoning from clear and present danger, reversed a general verdict
conviction under an ordinance that had been construed to cover
speech that "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a
condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance." 87 It is virtually certain that Ternainiello could have been properly convicted under an
ordinance requiring responsibility (incitement and causal connection)
for a more serious evil (breach of the peace).
3. Danger of Breach of the Peace, But No Incitement.-Incitement
to disorder involves a specific intent that disorder ensue. The
speaker, to be an inciter, must have some "enthusiasm for the
result."8 A notion of accidental incitement seems self-contradictory.
Usually one only incites his supporters. He makes his audience part
of his plan. It is conceivable that a speaker would deliberately
antagonize his audience with the intent that they break the peace in
trying to attack him. But usually, when the threat of disorder comes
from the speaker's antagonists, it is hard to fix him with an intent to
cause disorder or with inciting it.89 In such a case, the speaker
probably cannot be punished.9 0
Incitement also involves the use of language which, in the
circumstances, might be expected to lead to the particular behavior.
This could be assimilated to the question of intent, by saying a man
is taken to intend the natural consequences of his acts or words, as
is done in British cases on unlawful assembly. However, it seems
more related to the common sense requirement that the punished
conduct must have a causal relation to the apprehended evil. The
causal relation should be fairly strong, both because the Constitution
protects speech and because the court is not merely explaining an
event but is attributing criminal responsibility for it.
Our tentative conclusion that speech short of incitement to breach
of the peace is not punishable where breach of the peace is the only
evil apprehended, is supported by reference to the decisions concerning punishment of seditious and like speech. Apparently the only
86. Supranote 71.
87. 337 U.S. at 3.
88. Quotation from Gitlow v. New York, supra note 81, at 673 (dissent of
Holmes and Brandeis, JJ.).
89. Compare Beatty v. Gillbanks, 9 Q.B.D. 308 (1882).
90. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 70, at 308-10, where the Court
relied on lack of provocative intent, but also on excessive official discretion,
vagueness, and absence of legislated state policy, to reverse a breach of the
peace conviction. The speaker and his audience might still be guilty of

unlawful assembly because of their frightening non-speech behavior. Prob-

ably all who behaved so as to put firm observers in fear of violence could be
punished despite free speech objections. See generally State v. Butterworth,
104 N.J.L. 579, 142 Atl. 57 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928). In the United States there
have been few unlawful assembly cases with constitutional overtones, and
not one has gotten to the Supreme Court. It is more significant in England;
see pp. 645-47, 649 infra.
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kind of speech that is constitutionally punishable for its relation
to violent overthrow of the government is speech advocating or
inciting such action. 91 Violent overthrow of the government is, for
purposes of the clear and present danger test, a more serious evil
than breach of the peace.92 The evil is more remote in time in
sedition than in breach of the peace cases. But this interval between
speech and action is irrelevant if it does not provide occasion for a
spoken antidote. 93 Thus in the communist conspiracy cases, the time
gap does not make the seditious speech less punishable, the ultimate
state interest is threatened, and yet incitement seems required. If
incitement is necessary in order constitutionally to punish the more
punishable speech, surely nothing short of incitement would suffice
for the less punishable (because less dangerous) speech.
III. UMTED KINGDOM

A. Introduction
Even more than the American cases, the British cases should be
discussed in the three groups of before, during, and after the speech.
In Britain, there is no constitutional protection of speech to unify the
cases. They fall naturally into groups, according to the various
bases of state powers and subjects' remedies.
B. Before the Speech: Binding Over
Justices of the Peace may order a person to enter into recognizances
to keep the peace or to be of good behavior. This power may come
from the Justices of the Peace Act, 1361, 94 which created their office.
The recognizance is a contract of record, normally with the Crown
as obligee. The obligation is conditional upon specified conduct, e.g.,
disturbing the peace, by the obligor during a stated period. 95 If the
obligation is for money, the obligor may be ordered to find sureties
for his performance. 96
Binding over is much used in Britain, though not in the United
91. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); cf. Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
92. Dennis v. United States, supra note 91, at 509.
93. Yates v. United States, supra note 91; see Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (dissent of Holmes, J.).
94. 34 Edw. 3, c. 1. Or conservators of the peace may have had such power
even before the statute. Or binding over to good behavior may be statutory
whereas binding over to keep the peace is at common law. See generally
Lansbury v. Riley, [1914] 3 K.B. 229 (1913); 4

*256;

BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES

PUTNAM, PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE IN THE FOUR-

TEENTH AND FIFTEENTH CENTURIES, intro,
ALLEN, THE QUEEN'S PEACE 61-66 (1953).

at XXX (Ames Foundation 1938);
For our purposes, there is no differ-

ence between the two kinds of recognizances or between the two possible historical bases.
95. A sample recognizance may be seen in SHORT & MELLOR, THE PRACTICE
ON THE CROWN SIDE OF THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 672 (1890).

96. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 and I Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 91 (1).
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States, to restrain the rowdy and the rabble-rouser. We must consider how it works and what questions it presents when brought
to a court of record.
An order to enter into a recognizance to keep the peace or
to be of good behavior may follow a criminal conviction 97 or a
proceeding directed only at the binding over98 or even an acquittal of the crime charged. 99 Since 1879, it has been necessary for
the prospective obligor to be before the court, and the procedure
has been that for a normal criminal trial. 00
From the magistrate's order, there was no appeal properly so
called.' 0 ' The only ways to obtain review were by the prerogative
writ of certiorari 0 2 and by appeal by way of case stated. 03 Both
certiorari and case stated brought the order before a division of the
High Court of Justice, but on both the scope of review was narrow.
Apparently the court could quash the order only if, on the facts, a
reasonable magistrate could not have apprehended a breach of the
peace connected with the person bound over. 04 Since 1956, there
has been a right of appeal from recognizance orders. 0 5 It is likely
that the scope of review is now broader.
The important constitutional cases concern binding over, rather
than the later proceeding to estreat (forfeit) the recognizance. In
97. The King v. Sandbach, ex parte Williams, [1935] 2 K.B. 192.
98. Lansbury v. Riley, supra note 94; Wise v. Dunning, [1902] 1 K.B. 167
(1901).
99. Reg. v. Sharp, [1957] 1 Q.B. 552 (C.C.A.); Ex Parte Davis, 35 J.P.
551 (Q.B. 1871).
100. Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, 42 & 43 Vict., c. 49, § 25 (now Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, supra note 96, § 91 (1)).
101. Rex v. London Sessions, ex parte Beaumont, [1951] 1 K.B. 557 (1950);
The King v. London Quarter Sessions Appeals Committee, [1948] 1 K.B. 670
(1947).
102. As in The King v. Sandbach, ex parte Williams, supra note 97; The
Queen v. Justices of Londonderry, 28 L.R. Ir. 440 (Q.B. 1891); Ex parte Davis,
supranote 99.
103. As in Lansbury v. Riley, supra note 94; Wise v. Dunning, supra note
98. See Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, supra note 96, § 87 (formerly Summary
Jurisdiction Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 43 § 2, as amended by Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, supranote 100, § 33).
104. On certiorari, review was limited to whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, i.e., whether there was any evidence to support the order. The Queen
v. Justices of Londonderry, supra note 102, at 446, 461; cf. id. at 451-54. But
see id. at 450 (W. O'Brien, J., concurring dubitante). On case stated, review
was limited to jurisdiction and questions of law. Summary Jurisdiction Act,
1879, supra note 100, § 33(1) (now Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, supra note
96, § 87 (1)). The rubric of questions of fact, not reviewable on case stated,
was stretched wide by the courts. See Newman v. Baker, 8 C.B. (n.s.) 200,
141 Eng. Rep. 1142 (C.P. 1860); Reg. v. Yeomans, 1 L.T.R. (n.s.) 369 (Q.B.
1860); cf. Bracegirdle v. Oxley [1947] K.B. 349, 353 (1946). Restricted review
is a concomitant of broad discretion below. Binding over
of the magistrate's discretion. See The King v. Sandbach,
supra note 97; ALLEN, Op. cit. supra note 94, at 62.
105. Magistrates' Courts (Appeals from Binding Over
4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 44, § 1. The appeal is to Quarter Sessions,
are reported.

is largely a matter
ex parte Williams,

Orders) Act, 1956,
few of whose cases
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this later action, the procedure is the same as in a criminal trial.106
But whether the recognizance is forfeited depends entirely on what
was the condition of the recognizance. 107 The act of violation need
not itself be a crime. 108 Thus a person may have to pay money or go
to jail for doing two successive acts, neither of which was criminal.
More important for our purposes than the magistral procedure is
the question of what facts justify binding a speaker over. If he
violates the law, as where he himself disturbs the peace, he may be
bound over. 10 9 If he incites his audience to riot or to break the peace,
he may be bound over not to do so again."10 At the other extreme,
even before 1956, a reviewing court would quash the magistrate's
order if there was no evidence of speaker misconduct or audience
hostility."'
More difficult is the question of binding over a speaker whose
audience is ripe for riot, though the speaker has done no wrong.
Usually the anticipated violence would be by those hostile to the
speaker, directed against the speaker, and designed to stop the
speech. 112 In Beatty v. Gillbanks,113 Salvation Army paraders were
convicted of unlawful assembly and bound over to keep the peace,
solely because they had been attacked by the antagonistic "Skeleton
Army" and a repetition of such attacks was likely. On appeal, the
conviction was set aside and the recognizance order quashed on the
ground that the Salvationists could not be liable for their lawful act
merely because they knew it would cause others to act unlawfully.
In Wise v. Dunning,114 however, a speaker was bound over although
only his opponents threatened violence, and that against the speaker
himself. The speaker, a self-styled "Protestant Crusader," had given
anti-Catholic harangues in a Catholic section of Liverpool, followed
106. R. v. McGarry, 30 Crim. App. R. 187 (1945). Defendant may answer.
R. v. Pine, 24 Crim. App. R. 10 (1932). In accord with the general rule for
misdemeanor trials, defendant has no right to a jury. R. v. David, 27 Crim.
App. R. 50 (1939).
107. See R. v. McGarry, supra note 106.
108. Cf. R. v. David, supra note 106; Magistrates' Courts Act, 195Z, supra
note 96, § 96(1).
109. See The King v. Sandbach, ex parte Williams, supra note 97.
110. Lansbury v. Riley, supra note 98; see Haylock v. Sparke, 1 El. & B1.
471, 486-88, 118 Eng. Rep. 512 (Q.B. 1853).

111. The Queen v. Justices of Londonderry, supra note 102. This may still
be the only ground for quashing the order in Scotland and Northern Ireland,
where the Magistrates' Courts (Appeals from Binding Over Orders) Act,
1956, supra note 105, does not apply. The following discussion will be in terms
of the pre-1956 law unless otherwise stated.
112. Some of these cases, notably Beatty v. Gillbanks, supra note 89, involved parades. Parades are probably further from "speech" than is the
wearing of an emblem, as in Humphries v. Connor, 17 Ir. R.C.L. 1 (Q.B.
1864). Both are assimilated to cases of speech in the narrow sense by British
courts and writers. This may be due to the lack of a preferred status for
speech in the British constitution.
113. Supra note 89.
114. Supra note 98.
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on several occasions by opposition riots. Holding that disorder by
others was the "natural consequence" of such language, the divisional
court affirmed the magistrate's order.11 5 Thus Beatty v. Giflbanks
and Wise v. Dunning apparently conflict on whether a person can
be bound over merely because his lawful act is expected to provoke
another to do an unlawful act. The cases may be distinguished in
various ways, all of which express the feeling that the "Crusader"
was more responsible for his opponents' breaches of the peace than
were the Salvation Army paraders. For example: The paraders
were more peaceful, more normal. A listener might not unreasonably
want to assault a geyser of bile like the "Crusader."'1 6 The crowd's
antagonism in Beatty v. Gillbanks was aimed more at the Salvationists themselves and less at what they were doing or saying.
While the different degrees of fault can thus reconcile the two
decisions, the better view is that they were addressed to two different
questions: Beatty v. Gillbanks to unlawful assembly, and Wise v.
Dunning to whether a reviewing court would quash a magistrate's
recognizance order. In both cases, the speaker or paraders had
been bound over. Only in Beatty v. Gillbanks had they been tried
for unlawful assembly as well. This need have made no difference.
The court could have set aside the conviction without quashing the
recognizance order, on the ground either that one could be bound
over without being convicted, or that the scope of review of binding
over orders was narrower, even when review was on appeal from a
conviction rather than on certiorari or case stated. However, the
recognizance question was not considered separately from that of
unlawful assembly. It appears that the case was argued and decided
on the assumption that if the conviction were reversed, the binding
over order would fall with it."

7

The reason for this may be that the

only reason the (trial) Court of Petty Sessions gave for binding the
defendants over was that they were guilty of unlawful assembly." 8
Therefore, Beatty v. Gillbanks is just authority on unlawful assembly
and not on recognizances as such.
Both Beatty v. Gillbanks and Wise v. Dunning appear to turn on
whether the violence was the "natural consequence" of the speaker's
admittedly lawful acts." 9 It will be seen that the concept of "natural
115. Two of the Justices distinguished (without reasons) Beatty v. Gill-

banks, supra note 89. [19021 1 K.B. at 174, 179.
116. Compare Terminiello v. Chicago, supra note 71; Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, supra note 73; Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 70.
117. See Beatty v. Gillbanks, supra note 89, at 312-13 (arguments of counsel) and at 313-15 (opinion of Field, J.).

118. See id. at 308 (statement of proceedings below). While that summary
is inconclusive on the point, it appears that the recognizances were taken
only after conviction, by way of suspended sentence.
119. See Wise v. Dunning, supra note 98, at 175-76; Beatty v. Gillbanks,
supra note 89.
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consequence" is important in unlawful assembly as showing the
requisite intent. But that concept must be used, if at all, in a different
sense when a court is reviewing a binding over order. 120 There, it
indicates only that the speech is causally related to the disorder.
Wise v. Dunning is thus just an instance of the rule that, on certiorari
or case stated, a reviewing court will quash the binding over order
only if the magistrate had no grounds to anticipate a breach of the
peace.' 2 ' This is reasonable, for binding over does not stigmatize or
penalize as much as does a criminal conviction, and it is a discretionary matter with the magistrate. Thus it is not surprising that, in the
public meeting area as in others, a person who cannot be convicted
can nevertheless be bound over. If such a rule seems to put one's
freedom of speech and meeting too much into the hands of hostile
troglodytes, still in practice the magistrates have not pushed their
wide discretion to its limit. Wise v. Dunning, where the provocation
was extreme, appears the only case in which a lawful party has been
bound over in what we would consider a free speech situation.
All of this is from an appellate court's point of view. The pre-1956
cases gave the Justice of the Peace wide latitude but no guide. Now
that there is a right of appeal, Quarter Sessions may start to quash
orders binding over a person who could not be blamed for the anticipated disturbance. It is too early to tell. Such a development would
make a reality out of the popular conception of Beatty v. Gillbanks,
and elevate its glossators from error to prescience.
C. During the Speech: Intervention and Dispersal
The question here is under what circumstances an officer with a
duty to preserve the peace can disperse a lawful meeting merely
because it is likely to lead to a breach of the peace. 1' Three Irish
cases in the latter half of the nineteenth century' 23 made the rule
rather clear, but an important problem will be to determine how that
rule has been affected by a more recent English decision.124 All three
Irish cases were actions of assault brought against the officer by the
party with whom he interfered in order to preserve the peace. The
first two were decided on plaintiff's demurrer to a defense of neces120. In Wise v. Dunning, supra note 98, the court spoke of "natural conse-

quence" perhaps to show that, even under the rule in Beatty v. Gillbanks,
supra note 89, they would decide their case the same way.
121. See p. 629 supra.
122. This is the only aspect of a constable's power to disperse meetings
that raises any difficult problems. If the meeting is an unlawful assembly, he
can of course disperse it and arrest anyone involved. If the meeting is lawful,
but a breach of the peace is already in progress, the officer's powers will be,
if anything, broader than where the disturbance is imminent but the peace
is still unbroken.
123. Humphries v. Connor, supra note 112; O'Kelly v. Harvey, 14 L.R. Ir.
105 (C.A. 1883); Coyne v. Tweedy, [1898] 2 Ir. R. 167 (Q.B. & .C.A. 1896).
124. Duncan v. Jones, [1936] 1 K.B. 218 (1935).
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sity, and the third concerned the reasonableness and sufficiency of a
jury verdict that the technical assault was necessary to preserve the
peace.
25 the defendant
In Humphries v. Connor,1
constable pleaded that
it was necessary for him to remove plaintiff's orange lily in order
to prevent a breach of the peace by a crowd threatening to attack
plaintiff. 2 6 In overruling plaintiff's demurrer to this defense, the
court held a constable had a duty to preserve the peace unbroken, and
that although wearing the lily was lawful, still if the constable's
purpose in removing it was to preserve the peace, and this interference
with plaintiff's person was necessary to preserve the peace, then the
constable was not liable. 2 7 Apparently it was not essential to the
defense that the officer have first asked plaintiff to remove the lily.128
It is not clear whether the provocative character of the lily or the
plaintiff's intent in wearing it was relevant. 29
On similar pleadings, the Irish Court of Appeal in O'Kelly v.
Harvey 30 held that a Justice of the Peace was not liable in assault
for dispersing plaintiff's meeting because the defendant "believed
and had just grounds for believing that the peace could only be
preserved" by dispersing it. 31 This is the same holding as in Humphries v. Connor, which, unlike the instant case, involved neither
speech nor a meeting. The rule was carried over into a "public meeting" case without comment by the court, probably because in England
only ordinary law, and not a higher law, governs speech and assembly.132 O'Kelly v. Harvey makes it clear that the defense of necessity
is good although plaintiff's conduct be lawful and neither provocative
nor intended to cause disorder. 133
125. Supra note 112.

126. While the necessity of removing the lily to protect plaintiff from
physical injury was argued, the court decided the case solely on the defense
of necessity to preserve the peace. Id. at 8.
127. Provided, of course, he did not use unnecessary force. This fact was
separately averred in the plea, but logically can be included in the general
point that this particular assault was necessary to preserve the peace.
128. See 17 Ir. R.C.L. at 8. This, too, might be subsumed under the general
question of the necessity of the assault.
129. The facts, admitted by demurrer, were that wearing the lily was
"calculated and tended to provoke animosity among different classes of the
Queen's subjects." Id. at 1-2. O'Brien, J., did not discuss plaintiff's intent.
Hayes, J., seems to have thought she intended to provoke a breach of the
peace. Id. at 8. Fitzgerald, J., concurring dubitante, thought the defense
should be good only if plaintiff intended to provoke a breach of the peace.
Id. at 8-9. But a finding that plaintiff intended to cause disorder might have
been inconsistent with the finding that she was behaving lawfully.
130. Supra note 123.
131. Id. at 109-10.

132. Cf. DIcEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITuTION 239, 270-71 (9th ed. 1939).
133. As to lawfulness and intent, see 14 L.R. Ir. at 109-110. That the court
regarded plaintiff's conduct as not in itself provocative appears from the
holding that the assembly was not unlawful, despite the court's view that
an assembly that is likely to provoke breach of the peace is an unlawful
assembly. See id. at 109-10 (distinguishing and disapproving Beatty v. Gill-
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Coyne v. Tweedy 13 4 extended this defense of necessity to a peace
officer 135 who could and should have acted earlier, against another
party, to prevent the breach of the peace. 13 6 There, Officer D stood by
while Priest A and followers broke down the door of the church
wherein rival Priest P and followers were ensconced. When the two
clerics and their adherents confronted each other and violence seemed
imminent, Officer D forcibly removed P from the sacristy. P sued D
for assault. The jury found that D's action was reasonable and
necessary to preserve the peace. On P's motion for a new trial, the
divisional court and Court of Appeal held that even if D erred in
letting A break down the door, without which the ominous confrontation would not have occurred, still he had a good defense under
O'Kelly v. Harvey. 37 The courts reasoned that the defense depended
on the officer's duty to preserve the peace and the necessity for his
action when he acted. The fact that if he had done his duty earlier
he would not have had to act later was not held to alter either his
duty or the necessity for action later. Apparently the officer would
have lost his defense against P only if he himself had broken down
the door or had actively encouraged A to do it.-1
Under these three cases, the standard for dispersal of a public
meeting is as follows. An official with the duty of preserving the
peace may disperse a lawful meeting (or interrupt a speaker) if he
reasonably apprehends that it is the only way to avert a breach of the
peace, even by the meeting's antagonists. Apparently any notion of
clear and present danger of disorder is relevant only to the reasonableness of the officer's belief that disorder would otherwise follow.
The officer is not liable if his apprehension was "reasonable" on the
facts before him at the time. It is not necessary that the court agree
with his appraisal of those facts. Apparently the officer is not liable
even if his interference with the plaintiff turned out not to be sufficient to preserve the peace, so long as he reasonably believed it to be
necessary and sufficient. 39 But if the trial court in the assault action
banks, supra note 89).
134. Supra note 123.

135. Defendant was a district inspector of constabulary. His duty to preserve the peace was held to be the same as that of a constable (as in Humphries v. Connor, supra note 112) or a Justice of the Peace (as in O'Kelly v.
Harvey, supra note 123). Coyne v. Tweedy, supra note 123, at 171 (Q.B.).
136. Strangely enough, the case is not mentioned in DicEY, op. cit. supra
note 132, JENNINGS, LAW AND THE CoNsTruTIoN (4th ed. 1952), KEa & LAWSON,
CASES ON CONsTruTIONAL LAw (4th ed. 1954), or WADE & PHILLIns, CONSTI-

(5th ed. 1955).
137. Supra note 123.
138. See [1898] 2 Ir. R. at 178, 182, 189 (Q.B.), and id. at 196, 202, 204 (C.A.).
This may depend on a distinction between acting where there is a duty not to
act and not acting where there is a duty to act. Compare Sellers v. Johnson,

TUTIONAL LAW

163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948).

139. The question of sufficiency of the intervention is not expressly treated
in the cases. But the courts' use of the term "necessary" impliedly includes
"sufficient," or at least the joint sufficiency of all the officer's acts.
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following dispersal may be seen as entertaining an appeal from the
officer's on-the-spot judgment, comparable to a court reviewing a
magistrate's recognizance order, then the standard for binding over
seems even looser. Evidence sufficient to ground a constable's reasonable belief would probably confer jurisdiction to bind over.140 And,
unlike dispersal, binding over need not have been thought the only
way to preserve the peace.
Closer court scrutiny of dispersal than of binding over has, as we
have seen, a procedural basis. It is defensible on the ground that a
magistrate can be trusted with a wider discretion than can a policeman. But it has defects. A magistrate has more calm, more time, and
more evidence when deciding to take recognizances than does a
policeman when dispersing a meeting under the claws of a mob.
A binding over order imprints more stigma than does the breaking
up of a meeting, and imposes a continuing hardship, whereas dispersal is entirely past and usually involves only a nominal trespass.
And a decision against the state in the case of dispersal, but not of
binding over, will make a private person pay damages. Therefore,
one would expect a reviewing court to be more reluctant to secondguess dispersal than binding over. Before 1956, the law was the other
way around. Now that an appeal lies from binding over orders,
however, stricter standards for recognizances may develop.
It is important to consider how Duncan v. Jones141 has affected
these dispersal rules. There, the defendant was about to begin speaking at a street meeting opposite an unemployed training center when
a police inspector told her she would have to move the meeting to
another street. When defendant disregarded the request and began
to speak, the inspector arrested her. She was convicted, under the
Prevention of Crimes Acts, 1' of wilfully obstructing the officer in
the execution of his duty. On appeal to the King's Bench, the only
issue was whether instructing the defendant not to hold her meeting
as planned was within the scope of the officer's "duty." All three
Justices held that as he reasonably apprehended a breach of the
peace, 43 his duty to preserve the peace included requesting defendant
not to speak. 44 On this point, that the officer's apprehension must be
140. Such evidence wouId probably also reduce any of the magistrate's
mistakes to "errors of fact," and thus immunize his order from review by case
stated as well as by certiorari. See note 104 supra.
141. Supra note 124.
142. Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act, 1885, 48 & 49 Vict., c. 75, § 2,
amending Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., c. 112, § 12.
143. The trial court had so found. [1936] 1 K.B. 218, 220. Apparently the
main fact grounding the officer's fears was that, a year before, a speech by
defendant at the same spot had been followed by a disturbance inside the
center. The manager of the center thought defendant had "caused" this disturbance, and Lord Hewart, C.J., agreed. Id. at 220, 223.
144. Contra, E.C.S. Wade, Police Powers and Public Meetings, 6 CAMi. L.J.
175, 178 (1937), contending that the case did not involve any apprehended
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"reasonable" in the eyes of the court, the case is consistent with the
three Irish cases. Like those cases, Duncan v. Jones turned on the
scope of a peace officer's duty to interfere with someone who had
done nothing unlawful.145 But whereas the Irish cases 46 held it was
the officer's duty to disperse the meeting only if he reasonably believed that disorder was likely and that dispersing the lawful
meeting was the only way to avert it, the court in Duncan v. Jones
147
defined his duty to include any act calculated to preserve the peace.
Mr. Justice Humphreys put it most strongly: "Here it is found as a
fact that the respondent reasonably apprehended a breach of the
peace. It then... became his duty to prevent anything which in his
view would cause that breach of the peace."'148 Probably the causal
relation between the lawful meeting and the apprehended disturbance
must appear reasonable to the court. But the important point is that
neither the officer nor the court need believe that dispersing the
meeting was the only way to preserve the peace. True, it appears
that the apprehended disturbance would not have been by the defendant's opponents, as in the Irish cases.149 The rule in Duncan v.
Jones is susceptible to future limitation on that ground, but it formed
no part of the reasoning of the court.
D. After the Speech: Punishment
1. Incitement to Riot.-Riot is an indictable common law misdemeanor whose crux is a crowd using force in a common purpose. 150
Inciting another to commit a crime is itself a misdemeanor, even
though the principal crime is never committed. 151 If the other person
commits the misdemeanor urged, as where the crowd riots, then the
inciter is guilty of the principal offense. 152
breach of the peace.
145. "Neither was it alleged that the appellant nor any of the persons present at the meeting had either committed, incited or provoked any breach of
the peace." Duncan v. Jones, supra note 124, at 219. Note the past perfect
tense.
146. Supranote 123.
147. None of the three Justices mentions the concept of necessity. Nor do
they or counsel cite any of the Irish dispersal cases. Duncan v. Jones seems
to have been argued and decided with reference solely to Beatty v. Gillbanks,
supra note 89, which Lord Hewart, C.J., distinguished as concerning unlawful
assembly and not the scope of an officer's duty.
148. [1936] 1 K.B. at 223.
149. This is stressed, in a supple argument about causation, by Ksm &
LAwsoN, op. cit. supra note 136, at 402-03, criticized by H.W.R. Wade, Book
Review, [1954] CAMB. L.J. 263, 268. A narrower holding in Duncan v. Jones,
based on the fact (if it was a fact) that the disorder would have been by
defendant's supporters and that she was "not unwilling" that it should ensue,
would indeed have been more satisfactory. Counsel may have argued the
case that way. See [1936] 1 K.B. at 220, 221.
150. See Field v. Receiver of Metropolitan Police, [1907] 2 K.B. 853.
151. Reg. v. Gregory, 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 459 (C.C.A. 1867); R. v. Higgins,
2 East 5, 102 Eng. Rep. 269 (K.B. 1801).
152. Reg. v. Sharpe, 3 Cox Crim. Cas. 288 (Central Crim. Ct. 1848). Compare
18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1948).
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2. Unlawful Assembly.-Before the eighteenth century, an unlawful
assembly was just an incipient riot.153 The assemblers had to intend
to do an illegal act, 54 probably one involving violence. 55
Added later was a definition that looked not to the intent of the
assemblers but to their behavior. 156 If the gathering is such as to
make a normally courageous onlooker fear a breach of the peace, it
is, without more, an unlawful assemblylS 7 It appears that the fearinspiring conduct must be that of the defendant assemblers themselves. Thus where the defendants' meeting attracts a hostile crowd,
and only that crowd inspires fear, the meeting is not an unlawful
assembly unless the defendants intended to cause a breach of the
peace 5 8 This appears to be the best explanation of Beatty v. Gillbanks.15 9 There the defendant paraders were admittedly peaceful,
but the antagonistic mob was not. Hence defendants could not be
guilty of unlawful assembly under the post-1700 extension of the
crime, because their own behavior would not inspire fear. The case
was argued and decided with a view to the older branch of unlawful
assembly, which required evil intent. Thus the case turned on
whether an intent to cause a breach of the peace could be imputed
to the defendants because they knew their peaceful parade would
provoke their opponents to riot. Reasoning that one is taken to intend
the natural consequences of his acts, the court asked whether opposition violence was the natural consequence of defendants' acts, and
held it was not. 160 This is still good law, if the case is properly seen
as concerning only the intent of persons whose overt acts are admittedly lawful. One will not be taken to intend to cause a breach of
the peace merely because he expects one to ensue. He must have
153. CoKE, Tnrm INSTTUTE *176: "An unlawful assembly is when three or
more assemble themselves together to commit a riot or rout, and do it not."
See generally 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY or ENGLISH LAw 324-27 (1926).
154. Reg. v. Ellis, 2 Salk. 596, 91 Eng. Rep. 504 (Nisi Prius 1708).
155. LAMBARD, EImENARCHA 175 (1614): "An unlawful Assembly, is of the

company of three or more persons, disorderly coming together, forcibly to
commit an unlawful act .... " See 5 HOLDSWORTH op. cit. supra note 153, at
198; 8 Id. at 325.
156. HAWKINs, PLEAS OF THE CROwN, Bk. I, ch. 65,

§ 9 (1st ed. 1716), criticizing the older definitions as too narrow. Cf. Jarrett & Mund, The Right of
Assembly, 9 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 1, 5-6 (1931) (same conclusion as to two heads
of unlawful assembly, but different chronology). It should be noted that the
new definition supplemented, but did not supplant, the old. After Hawkins,
there were two alternative ways for an assembly to be unlawful.

157. Reg. v. Cunninghame Graham, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 420, 427-28 (Central
Crim. Ct. 1888); Reg. v. Vincent, 9 Car. & P. 91, 109, 173 Eng. Rep. 754 (Nisi
Prius (1839)); Reg. v. Soley, 2 Salk. 594, 595, 91 Eng. Rep. 503 (Q.B. 1708)
(dictum).
158. See Reg. v. Clarkson, 17 Cox Crim. Cas. 483, 490 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1892);
IENNY, OummEs or CRnvmnAL LAW 329-30 (16th ed. 1952).
159. 9 Q.B.D. 308 (1882).
160. Id. at 314 (opinion of Field, J.). Similar reasoning was used, under a

breach of the peace statute, in Beaty v. Glenister, 51 L.T.R. (n.s.) 304 (Q.B.
1884).
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more connection with the violence than simply being its victim. 161
Unlawful assembly chiefly concerns meetings rather than speech.
To constitute the offense, three or more persons must participate, that
is, share the intent or behave so as to cause fear of disorder.162 Therefore, the offense is not committed when a single speaker, intending to
cause a breach of the peace, speaks to a peaceful audience. Only if
the audience becomes menacing or partakes of the speaker's intent,
can the speaker be convicted of unlawful assembly. 163
IV. COMPARISON
A. Before the Speech
The restraining techniques of the two countries are so different
that comparison may distort what it tries to draw together. In England before 1956, a magistrate's binding over order would be upheld
if there were any evidence to support the magistrate's apprehension
of a breach of the peace. 164 Such wide discretion even in a judicial
officer would be stricken down in the United States unless perhaps
the binding over followed conviction, replaced a penalty that the
magistrate had jurisdiction to impose, and was conditioned on repetition of the same crime. In such a case it might survive constitutional
challenge on the analogy to increased penalties for second offenders.
But the statute would have to limit the binding over powers in speech
cases to such a situation. After 1956, the right of appeal in England
from a binding over order may narrow the magistrates' discretion. 6 5
If so, they may be able in the future to take recognizances only from
inciters and provocateurs among those who do not themselves break
the law. This practice might be held constitutional in the United
States, at least if the condition were a punishable act.
In the United States, only time and place and perhaps anticipated
responsibility for disorder are constitutional standards for licensing
schemes. 166 No English recognizance has been found based on considerations of time and place. An American licensing standard of
riot or disorder would have to be so narrowly drawn, in both criteria
and discretion, as to be incomparable with English binding over practice, whose hallmark is its flexibility. And even such a license law,
161. Dicta in Wise v. Dunning, [1902] 1 K.B. 167 (1901), support inferring
such an intent from very provocative language. But that case concerned
binding over, not unlawful assembly. See discussion, text at note 114 supra.
162. STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE CRvMINAL LAw 75 (9th ed. 1950); 4 BLAcKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 94, *146; cf. Rex v. Sudbury, 1 Ld. Raym. 484, 91
Eng. Rep. 1222 (K.B. 1701).
163. This proposition seems to follow from the accepted principles, but no
case or treatise authority has been found for or against it.
164. See pp. 637-41 & note 104 supra.
165. See pp. 638-39 supra.
166. See pp. 627-28 supra.
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unlike binding over, would necessarily stop the good as well as the
bad speech of those who were denied licenses. 16 7
In the United States, injunctions are a restraining technique similar
in impact to binding over.168 It appears that one who, on sufficient
evidence, is expected to incite breach of the peace or any other crime
may be enjoined from doing so. 169 In England he could be bound

over.170 But it is not clear that an American injunction, unlike an
English recognizance, can constitutionally reach any other speaker.

B. During the Speech
In Britain, a peace officer has common law power to disperse a
lawful meeting only if he reasonably apprehends that that is the
only way to prevent a breach of the peace. 71 If our analysis of the
American cases is correct, such is the rule in the United States where
the speaker does not intend to cause a breach of the peace. 72
In Britain, under the Prevention of Crimes Acts, it is a crime
for the speaker to disobey the officer who, reasonably believing-that
a breach of the peace will occur, stops the speaker or disperses the
meeting. 1 3 Such intervention need not be the only practicable way
for the officer to preserve the peace. 7 4 Thus the officer has wider
dispersal powers under statute than at common law. In the United
States, the officer has this same wide power where the speaker in75
tended to cause a breach of the peace.
In the two countries, the narrow dispersal powers are the same,
as are the broader ones. It is not surprising that in the United States,
where the question is of constitutional limits, the extent of the restraining power should depend on the blameworthiness of the speaker.
Nor is it surprising that in Britain, where the limits on a power are
not set by an extrinsic higher law, the extent of the power should
depend on its source.
C. After the Speech
On punishment of speech that leads to disorder, the United States
constitutional limitations and the limits of coverage of the British
167. Under a licensing scheme, the applicant may either make the whole
speech or none of it. The recognizance is conditioned on certain kinds of
behavior, including speech. No instance has been found of a person's being
bound over not to speak publicly at all. Further, if one starts to speak without the necessary license, he thereby breaks the law and can be arrested at
once; whereas, even if one speaks so as to violate the condition of his recognizance, he does not thereby break the law and presumably cannot be arrested.
His contractual obligation to the Crown just becomes absolute.
168. See pp. 629-30 supra.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See p. 629 supra.
See text accompanying note 110 supra.
See pp. 642-44 supra.
See pp. 630-33 supra.
173. See p. 644 supra.
174. See p. 645 supra.
175. See pp. 630-33 supra.
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common law offenses coincide almost perfectly. Despite a shortage
of direct authority, it appears that in the United States the speaker
can only be punished if he intended that disorder ensue and used
language which in the circumstances would be expected to produce
that disorder. 7 6 This may be condensed into a requirement that the
speaker have advocated or incited a breach of the peace.
In Britain, incitement is not unnaturally required for conviction of
inciting to riot.'" Unlawful assembly also, according to our historical
analysis of the cases, involves an intent that disorder ensue, if the
speaker himself is behaving peaceably. 7 8 Where the speaker is urging
his supporters to break the peace, his intent will be apparent and
will be shared by at least the necessary two members of his audience.17 9 Where only the speaker's opponents are disorderly, the
speaker can be held criminally responsible only if his behavior in the
circumstances imputes to him an intent to provoke his opponents to
break the peace. 180 While it is difficult to predict what a court will do
when it seeks to find intent in this way, it may be that in an extreme
case an English court would convict for unlawful assembly on facts
that an American court would hold constitutionally insufficient to
justify punishment.
176. See pp. 636-37 supra. Explosively insulting speech is, however, punishable regardless of the speaker's intent, under the doctrine of fighting words.
See p. 634 supra. One could perhaps explain incitement cases by a similar
objective theory.
Some parts of New York Penal Law § 722, set forth in note 38 supra, do not
appear to meet the standard stated in the text. No case has been found in
which § 722 was challenged as unconstitutional on its face. But cf. Feiner v.
New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). See also note 5 supra.
177. See p. 645 supra.
178. See pp. 646-47 supra.
179. See p. 647 supra.
180. See pp. 646-47 supra. Such an intent would probably identify the
speaker with his audience enough to satisfy the three-person requirement.

